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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Edgar Farfan-Galvan appeals from his conviction for felony DUI. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Farfan with felony DUI. (R., pp. 60-61.) The 
enhancement to a felony was based on prior misdemeanor DUI convictions in 
both Jerome and Twin Falls counties. (R., p. 61.) Farfan filed a Motion to 
Dismiss or Remand, collaterally attacking the prior Twin Falls misdemeanor DUI 
conviction. (R., pp. 54-58.) The state responded. (R., pp. 68-89.) The 
documents submitted by the parties show that Farfan applied for a public 
defender in the prior case (R., p. 75), but that the trial court denied Farfan's 
application (R., p. 76). The district court found that the trial court's denial of 
counsel in the prior case had not been a denial of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment, and denied the Motion to Dismiss or Remand. (R., pp. 90-96.) 
Farfan entered a guilty plea preserving his right to challenge the district 
court's rejection of his collateral attack on the prior conviction. (12/22/14 Tr., p. 
3, L. 18 - p. 4, L. 7; R., pp. 115-16.) Farfan thereafter timely appealed from the 
entry of judgment. (R., pp. 119, 134.) 
1 
ISSUE 
states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Farfan-Galvan's motion to 
reduce his charge to a misdemeanor where one of the underlying 
misdemeanor convictions used to elevate his conviction in this case 
to a felony was obtained through violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Farfan failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that Farfan 
failed to show that he was denied counsel in his prior misdemeanor DUI 
conviction? 
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ARGUMENT 
Farfan Failed To Show That He Was Denied Counsel In His Prior Misdemeanor 
DU I Conviction 
A Introduction 
The district court found the following procedure in relation to the prior 
misdemeanor DUI conviction: 
On 09/05/10, Galvan was arrested for misdemeanor DUI. He 
bonded out before arraignment and appeared at the courthouse 
counter on 09/09/10. While at the counter, he signed (1) a 
Notification of Misdemeanor Rights, (2) a Notification of Penalties 
for Future Violations of Driving Under the Influence, (3) a Plea of 
Guilty form, and (4) a Notice of Hearing. The notice of hearing set 
Galvan's "Acceptance of Plea and Sentencing" for 10/05/10. On 
09/14/10, Galvan submitted an application for the appointment of a 
public defender. That application was denied the following day and 
a letter explaining that denial was sent to Galvan. 
(R., pp. 94-95 (footnotes omitted).) Based on this procedure, the district court 
concluded that the denial of counsel had not been contrary to Farfan's rights to 
counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). (R., p. 96.) 
On appeal Farfan argues that the court erred because he was in fact 
indigent and denied representation at government expense in the prior DUI. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-17.) Review of the record, however, shows that Farfan 
was not indigent at the time he applied for counsel in the prior DUI case, and he 
therefore failed to prove that the conviction in that case resulted from denial of 
counsel. 
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Standard Of Review 
are questions law subject to free 
Court." State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314, 316 (2004). Factual 
findings of the district court are accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous. 
State v. Schwab, 153 Idaho 325,329,281 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 2012). 
C. Farfan Did Not Show That He Was Indigent, And Therefore Wrongly 
Denied Counsel At Government Expense 
A defendant has no constitutional right to "collaterally attack the validity" of 
prior convictions used for enhancement "with the sole exception of convictions 
obtained in violation of the right to counsel." Weber, 140 Idaho at 92, 90 P.3d at 
317. The right to "collaterally attack prior convictions used for sentence 
enhancement purposes cannot be extended beyond the right, established in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 ... (1963), to have appointed counsel." kl at 
93, 90 P.3d at 318. 
In Gideon, the Supreme Court announced what is now the "well settled" 
right of an "indigent defendant" to "court appointed counsel." State v. Clayton, 
100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980) (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335). 
The burden of showing indigence is on the defendant. Quinlivan v. State, 94 
Idaho 334, 335, 487 P.2d 928, 929 (1971); Schwab, 153 Idaho at 330, 281 P.3d 
at 1108. 
The record in this case shows that in his application for appointment of 
counsel in his prior DUI case Farfan reported income of $2,800 per month and 
expenses of $1,028 per month. (R., 75.) This left about $1,772 per month to pay 
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for an attorney. The record shows that Farfan did not establish his indigence, 
and thus a right to appointed counsel, in the prior DUI case. Because the record 
did not establish denial of counsel to an indigent defendant, the district 
correctly rejected Farfan's collateral attack on this judgment. 
On appeal Farfan first argues that the district court erred by not presuming 
he was indigent. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.1) This argument is specious. Nothing in 
the law cited by Farfan required the district court to ignore the evidence. State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a party waives an issue 
on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking). On the contrary, Farfan had 
the burden of producing evidence showing that he was denied a right to court-
appointed counsel. Schwab, 153 Idaho at 330, 281 P.3d at 1108. 
Farfan next argues that the district court erred by not attributing half of the 
household income to his girlfriend while at the same time making Farfan 
responsible for all of the household financial obligations. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-
1 Farfan relies heavily upon evidence that he seeks to submit on appeal. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 9 n. 5 (citing an "NLADA Report" to support the factual 
assertion that the judge in the underlying DUI case did not appoint counsel 
because he did not intend to impose jail time); p. 10 n. 7 (again citing NLADA 
Report for the factual claim that appointment of counsel has been inconsistent); 
p. 10 n. 9 (citing a Census Bureau website for the 2010 poverty rate for a family 
of 3).) The state objects to this attempt to present evidence for the first time on 
appeal. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007) 
(attempt to introduce new evidence on appeal "is improper and will be 
disregarded"). Even if the new evidence were considered, Farfan's arguments 
are specious. Farfan's claim that he proved that the magistrate did not appoint 
counsel because he did not intend to impose jail time when the charged crime 
carries a mandatory minimum of 10 days, I.C. § 18-8005(4), is far-fetched at 
best. His claim that Farfan's family income of $33,600 is less than $27,306 
(187% of the poverty threshold for a family of three in 2010) is either 
mathematically wrong or legally dubious because it excludes half the family 
income in order to find the family indigent. 
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10.) This argument is again specious, and unsupported by legal authority for the 
household expenses must all be presumed be 
Farfan while household income cannot be considered as a factor in determining 
indigency. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 
Finally, Farfan argues the record does not show a valid waiver of the right 
to counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-17.) He has failed to show, however, that 
adequacy of the waiver of counsel is a ground upon which he may collaterally 
attack a prior conviction. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. To the 
contrary, denial of counsel under Gideon was the exclusive available means to 
collaterally attack the prior conviction. Weber, 140 Idaho at 93, 90 P.3d at 318; 
see Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994) ("failure to appoint counsel 
for an indigent defendant is a unique constitutional defect," and the only collateral 
attack the Constitution requires that a defendant be able to make on a prior 
conviction used as an enhancement). 
The evidence before the district court showed that Farfan failed to prove a 
Constitutional entitlement to court-appointed counsel in the prior misdemeanor 
DUI. He thus failed to establish that he was denied his right of counsel, the only 
legal ground on which he could collaterally attack the prior judgment being used 
for enhancement purposes. He has failed to show error on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment 
district court. 
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015. 
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